

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 10254

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP, PK

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S VISIT TO PAKISTAN: JOINT STATEMENT

1. UNFORTUNATELY THE DRAFT JOINT STATEMENT CAME UNSTUCK HERE TONIGHT ON TWO POINTS OF ISSUE, AND I BELIEVE BOTH REQUIRE YOUR PERSONAL ATTENTION.

2. AGHA SHAHI ASKED THAT I SEE HIM TONIGHT RE CHANGES IN THE COMMUNIQUE. HE READ ME A NOTE FROM BHUTTO SAYING THAT THE JOINT STATEMENT I HAD SHOWED HIM LAST NIGHT SEEMED SATISFACTORY TO HIM UNTIL HE HAD READ THE TEXT OF YOUR JOINT STATEMENT IN DELHI. AFTER SEEING THAT, HE WAS CONCERNED OVER THE LAST SENTENCE THEREOF INDICATING THAT INDIRA GANDHI HAD EXTENDED AN INVITATION TO PRESIDENT FORD TO VISIT INDIA, AND THAT YOU HAD ACCEPTED FOR HIM. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN QUITE PLEASED WITH THE MENTION IN OUR DRAFT OF HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON, BUT NOW THAT THE INDIAN JOINT STATEMENT INDICATED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA HAD ISSUED AN INVITATION FOR PRESIDENT FORD TO VISIT INDIA NEXT YEAR, WHICH HAD BEEN ACCEPTED, A NEW LIGHT HAS BEEN PLACED ON THE SITUATION. HE SAID HE DID NOT LIKE THE PUBLIC OPINION IMPLICATIONS OF AN ANNOUNCEMENT THAT PRESIDENT FORD WOULD VISIT INDIA (WITH NO REFERENCE TO PAKISTAN) AND TWO DAYS LATER AN ANNOUNCEMENT HE WAS INVITED TO

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WASHINGTON. SHAHI THEREFORE ASKED IF THE LAST TWO SENTENCES IN THE

JOINT STATEMENT COULD BE DROPPED AND THE FOLLOWING SUBSTITUTED THEREFOR: "THE PRIME MINISTER CONVEYED AN INVITATION FOR PRESIDENT FORD TO VISIT PAKISTAN IN 1975, AND SECRETARY KISSINGER ACCEPTED THE INVITATION ON BEHALF OF THE PRESIDENT."

3. I TOLD SHAHI THAT I WAS CONCERNED BY THE LACK OF TIME LEFT TO ENTERTAIN THIS SUGGESTION, AS THE SECRETARY WAS TRAVELLING AND WOULD OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO CONSULT THE WHITE HOUSE. I ALSO ASKED IF THIS MEANT THAT BHUTTO HAD CHANGED HIS MIND ABOUT WANTING TO GO TO WASHINGTON AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. HE REPLIED THAT BHUTTO WANTED VERY MUCH TO GO TO WASHINGTON, BUT THAT WOULD NOW DEPEND ON THE TIMING OF PRESIDENT FORD'S VISIT TO INDIA. I SAID THE TIMING ON THE LATTER WAS OF COURSE VERY VAGUE AND IT MIGHT WELL NOT BE UNTIL LATE 1975. HE SAID IN THAT CASE BHUTTO WOULD HOPE HE COULD CONTINUE ON WITH THE WASHINGTON VISIT, BUT IF FORD CAME TO THE AREA EARLY IN 1975 THEN PERHAPS HIS TRIP SHOULD BE DROPPED. HE SAID IN ANY EVENT THE INVITATION FOR BHUTTO TO VISIT WASHINGTON SHOULD BE DROPPED FROM THE JOINT STATEMENT AND MERELY COVERED IN THE DISCUSSIONS. I TOLD SHAHI I WOULD REPORT ALL THIS TO YOU.

4. BHUTTO'S NOTE ALSO REFERRED TO THE FACT THAT SHAHI HAD TOLD HIM OVER THE PHONE THAT THERE WAS ONE HAIR-RAISING ASPECT OF THE JOINT STATEMENT IN INDIA WHICH SHOULD BE COUNTER-BALANCED HERE. BHUTTO TOLD SHAHI TO WORK THIS OUT WITH ME WITHOUT DELAY, AS HE DEFINITELY WANTED THE JOINT STATEMENT SETTLED PRIOR TO THE BEGINNING OF HIS TALKS WITH YOU. THIS MEANS, OF COURSE, THAT BHUTTO DID NOT KNOW AS OF THEN WHAT SHAHI'S POINT OF DIFFERENCE WAS, AND SHAHI PRESENTED TO ME TONIGHT A FOREIGN OFFICE VIEW DEVELOPED

AFTER A LENGTHY MEETING WITH HIS STAFF. THE PROBLEM IS THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 3 OF YOUR JOINT STATEMENT IN INDIA WHICH READS AS FOLLOWS: "BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT IT WAS IN THE INTEREST OF ALL THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION TO LIVE IN PEACE AND HARMONY ON THE BASIS OF SOVEREIGN EQUALITY AND WITHOUT INTERVENTION BY OUTSIDE POWERS OR ATTEMPTS BY SUCH POWERS TO GAIN POSITIONS OF SPECIAL PRIVILEGE IN THE REGION." SHAHI SAID THE FIRST PART OF THE ABOVE SENTENCE WAS GOOD AS WAS THE PHRASE AT THE END "OR ATTEMPTS BY SUCH POWERS TO GAIN POSITIONS OF SPECIAL PRIVILEGE IN THE REGION" WHICH HE ASSUMED HAD BEEN DRAFTED BY THE U.S. SIDE. HE TOOK SURPRISINGLY STRONG EXCEPTION TO THE PHRASE IN THE MIDDLE, "AND CONFIDENTIAL

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WITHOUT INTERVENTION BY OUTSIDE POWERS." I TOLD HIM I WAS MYSTIFIED BY HIS OBJECTION TO THOSE SEEMINGLY BENEVOLENT WORDS.

5. SHAHI SAID THEY MIGHT BE STANDARD BOILER-PLATE (AS I HAD SUGGESTED)

FOR AVERAGE CONSUMPTION, BUT THEY MEAN A GREAT DEAL INDEED IN VIEW OF THE HISTORY OF THE SUBCONTINENT. HIS ARGUMENTATION WAS QUITE INTELLECTUAL,

AS IS HIS NATURE, BUT IT REALLY BOILED DOWN TO THE FACT THAT WE HAD ACCEPTED THE INDIAN POSITION WHICH MAKES THEM UNDISPUTED RULER OF THE SOUTH ASIAN ROOST. IN OTHER WORDS, HE FEELS INDIA WOULD CONSIDER ITSELF HOMEFREE TO EXERCISE GROWING HEGEMONY OVER SOUTH ASIA WITHOUT OBJECTION FROM U.S. HE SAID THIS WAS THE POSITION OF NEHRU IN HIS ARGUMENTATION THAT THE SUPPLY OF U.S. MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO PAKISTAN WAS INTERVENTION BY AN OUTSIDE POWER IN THE AREA. HE SAID THAT "NON-INTERVENTION" IN "REGIONS" WAS A PECULIAR THING AS REGIONS HAD NO LEGAL ENTITY, AND WHY SHOULD THE SUBCONTINENT ONLY BE PICKED OUT FOR SUCH TREATMENT, AND NOT REGIONS SUCH AS THE MIDDLE EAST WHERE BIG POWER INTERFERENCE WAS OPENLY ACCEPTED. HE SAID THE SOVIETS HAD MADE NO BONES ABOUT THEIR EXTENSIVE INTERESTS IN THE SUBCONTINENT, QUOTING GROMYKO IN A 1968 SPEECH. SO HE SAID, UNLESS THE SOVIETS ARE PREPARED TO GIVE UP THEIR TREATY WITH INDIA, STOP THE SUPPLY OF ARMS, ETC., THIS PHRASE WAS A MEANINGLESS THING AS FAR AS INDIA WAS CONCERNED BUT WOULD WORK TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF PAKISTAN. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION LATER HE SAID HE WOULD EXPECT THE INDIANS TO ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THIS PHRASE IN THE FUTURE. HE THOUGHT IT NOT UNLIKELY THAT THEY WOULD ATTEMPT TO USE IT WITH THE CHINESE TO STOP CHINESE MILITARY SUPPLY TO PAKISTAN AS INTERFERENCE OF OUTSIDE POWERS IN THE AREA. I COULD NOT HELP BUT INTERJECT THAT I THOUGHT THAT ENTIRELY UNLIKELY, AND THAT IT WOULD BE PREPOSTEROUS TO THINK THE CHINESE WOULD PAY ANY ATTENTION TO IT IF THEY DID. I ASKED SHAHI TO CONTINUE.

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TO AMEMBASSY DACCA NIACT IMMEDIATE

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AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 10254

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FOR THE SECRETARY

6. SHAHI SAID THAT HE HAD SPLIT PARAGRAPH 2 OF OUR PROPOSED DRAFT INTO TWO PARAGRAPHS. THEY WERE AS FOLLOWS: "THE SECRETARY CONVEYED PRESIDENT FORD'S PERSONAL GREETINGS TO THE PRIME MINISTER AND REITERATED THE PRESIDENT'S ASSURANCE THAT CONTINUED SUPPORT TO THE SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF A STRONG, SECURE AND PROSPEROUS PAKISTAN, AS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE, WOULD REMAIN A GUIDING PRINCIPLE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. THE PRIME MINISTER WARMLY RECIPROCATED PRESIDENT FORD'S MESSAGE AND WELCOMED THE PRESIDENT'S ASSURANCE AND HIS DESIRE TO MAINTAIN AND EXPAND THE CLOSE AND FREINDLY RELATIONS WHICH HAVE TRADITIONALLY EXISTED BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS.

"THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY AGREE THAT MUTUAL RESPECT FOR THE PRINCIPLES OF SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER COUNTRIES WAS ESSENTIAL FOR PEACEFUL RELATIONS AMONG ALL STATES. THE TWO SIDES AFFIRMED THEIR OPPOSITION TO EFFORTS BY ANY COUNTRY TO SEEK EXPANSION OR ESTABLISH HEGEMONY IN THE REGION."

7. THE FIRST THREE SENTENCES OF THIS REDRAFT ARE ALL RIGHT AS THIS IS A REARRANGEMENT OF OUR DRAFT, BUT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE LAST SENTENCE IS LIFTED FROM THE SECTION OF YOUR SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE WHICH SAID "NEITHER SHOULD SEEK HEGEMONY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION AND CONFIDENTIAL

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EACH IS OPPOSED TO EFFORTS BY ANY OTHER COUNTRY OR GROUP OF COUNTRIES TO ESTABLISH SUCH HEGEMONY."

8. I TOLD SHAHI I WAS SURPRISED AT HIS INTERPRETATION OF THE SENTENCE HE OBJECTED TO AND SAID THAT HIS HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE PERHAPS MADE HIM READ INTO WORDS WHAT OTHER WOULD NOT SEE. I SAID THE AVERAGE READER MIGHT BE JUST AS LIKELY TO INTERPRET THE SENTENCE HE WAS WORRIED ABOUT AS A VICTORY FOR OUR SIDE AND WOULD THINK THE RUSSIAN POSITION IN INDIA WAS THE MAIN TARGET OF THE SENTENCE. I ALSO SAID HE WAS IGNORING THE FIRST PART OF THE SENTENCE WHICH REFERRED TO COUNTRIES IN THE REGION LIVING IN PEACE AND HARMONY ON THE BASIS OF SOVEREIGN EQUALITY, WHICH WAS OF SO MUCH IMPORTANCE TO PAKISTAN. I ASKED IF IN SUCH A HAPPY STATE OF AFFAIRS PAKISTAN ITSELF WOULD NOT BE AGAINST THE INTERVENTION OF OUTSIDE POWERS. I SAID IF CONDITIONS WERE SUCH THAT THE FIRST PART OF THIS SENTENCE BECAME INOPERATIVE IT COULD BE QUESTIONED WHETHER THE LAST PART TO WHICH HE OBJECTED WOULD REMAIN VALID.

9. I TOLD SHAHI THAT I THOUGHT HE WAS OVERLY DISTURBED AS THE WORDING OF THE INDIAN JOINT STATEMENT COULD ALSO BE READ TO

PROHIBIT THE SOVIET'S SUPPORT OF INDIA INTERVENING AS THEY HAD DONE IN 1971. I ASKED, IF HE WOULD ARGUE ON THE BASIS OF THIS WORDING THAT THE INDIAN-SOVIET TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP SHOULD BE CANCELLED, WHETHER HE ALSO CONCLUDED THAT OUR OWN DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD GO OUT THE WINDOW. HE INTERJECTED TO SAY, OF COURSE NOT. IT WAS CLEAR THAT YAQUB KHAN, WHO WAS WITH US HAD ARGUED AGAINST THIS LAST MINUTE CHANGE AND I HAVE A FEELING I SHOOK SHAHI IN HIS ENDEAVOR. THEY BOTH WENT OFF TO SEE BHUTTO AS I LEFT. I TOLD THEM I WOULD OF COURSE SUBMIT THIS CONVERSATION TO YOU, THAT I HOPED WE COULD GET IT ALL SOLVED BEFORE YOUR MEETINGS BEGIN HERE, BUT THAT I WAS NOT SURE NOW THAT THIS COULD BE DONE.

10. WHAT WAS DIFFICULT FOR ME, AND I SUPPOSE FOR SHAHI AS WELL, IS THAT WE DO NOT KNOW THE NEGOTIATING HISTORY OF THIS PARTICULAR SENTENCE IN YOUR JOINT STATEMENT IN INDIA. WITHOUT SUCH KNOWLEDGE, I CANNOT OF COURSE BE CERTAIN THAT THERE MAY NOT BE SOME GROUNDS FOR HIS EMOTION, OR THAT MY ARGUMENTATION WAS PRECISELY ON TARGET.

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11. I NEED COMMENTS AS SOON AS YOU CAN GET THEM TO ME IN THE HOPES THAT I CAN STILL SETTLE THIS OUTSIDE THE MEETINGS. I KNOW FOR CERTAIN BHUTTO DOES NOT WANT TO WASTE HIS TIME WITH YOU ARGUING ABOUT WORDS. FOR THAT REASON HE MIGHT OVERRULE SHAHI COMPLETELY, BUT I DOUBT HE WOULD DO SO UNLESS HE HEARS THAT SHAHI AND I CANNOT WORK IT OUT BETWEEN US, OR GETS SOME EXPLANATION THAT CALMS WORRIES HERE. I COULD WORK ON THIS WHILE YOU ARE HAVING LUNCH IF THERE IS ANY OPPORTUNITY TO ANSWER BY THAT TIME.
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